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new scientific or technical information that might af-
fect the assessment of the safety of a food additive on 
manufacturers or users. Furthermore, Member States 
shall maintain systems to monitor the consumption 
and use of food additives on a risk-based approach 
and report their findings with appropriate frequency 
to the Commission and the EFSA.
IV. Conclusions
It would appear therefore that adequate protection 
systems are in place and that said systems are capable 
of ensuring a safe use of food additives in foodstuffs. 
Moreover, the continued surveillance and regular re-
evaluation of food additives in the light of changing 
conditions of use and new scientific information will 
help to further define the needs and the setting of the 
order of priorities for the competent authorities vis-
à-vis the assessment of the safety of food additives.
However, a proper assessment of the actual 
achievement of the objectives pursued by the Addi-
tives Regulation will only be conducted over the next 
few years.
Intellectual Property
This section is devoted to giving readers an inside view 
of the crossing point between intellectual property (IP) 
law and risk regulation. In addition to updating read-
ers on the latest developments in IP law and policies 
in technological fields (including chemicals, pharma-
ceuticals, biotechnology, agriculture and foodstuffs), 
the section aims at verifying whether such laws and 
policies really stimulate scientific and technical pro-
gress and are capable of minimising the risks posed 
by on-going industrial developments to individuals’ 
health and safety, inter alia.
Seizures of In Transit Generics at the 
EU Borders: India and Brazil v. the EU
Enrico Bonadio and Carlo Maria Cantore*
I. Introduction
The row between India and Brazil on the one hand 
and the European Union (EU) on the other regarding 
customs detentions of Indian generic drugs headed 
for developing countries may soon come to an end. 
Indeed, negotiations between the parties are on go-
ing and there are constant rumours of an upcoming 
settlement of the dispute. Yet it remains interesting 
to analyse this dispute as other countries could take 
measures similar to those of the EU. In this case, 
WTO adjudicatory bodies might soon be called upon 
to assess the compatibility of these measures with 
TRIPS and GATT provisions.
The case was brought to the attention of the 
WTO on May 2010 by India and Brazil1. These states 
pointed out that customs rules in the EU, Regulation 
1383/2003 in particular, allowed customs authorities 
to detain certain lots of Indian generics in transit 
to non-EU states2. From the point of view of India 
and Brazil, these measures contradict relevant TRIPS 
and GATT provisions3. The case has spurred a debate 
because these measures could affect or impede the 
protection of public health in some countries, namely 
the African and Latin American states that are usu-
ally the final destination of the Indian manufactured 
generics. Indeed – as India and Brazil have put it 
– most of these countries are in dire need of reason-
* Enrico Bonadio (City University London); Carlo Maria Cantore 
(Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa). Comments are welcome and 
should be sent to <enrico.bonadio.1@city.ac.uk> and <c.cantore@
sssup.it>.
1 Two separate complaints have been filed on May and June 2010, 
respectively, by India (DS 408, EU – Seizure of Generic Drugs in 
Transit) and Brazil (DS 409, EU – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Tran-
sit) against the EU and one of its Member States (The Netherlands). 
Hereinafter, for ease of reference, when referring to the defend-
ants we will mention just the EU. Summaries of the two complaints 
are available on the Internet (India – EU, at <http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm>; Brazil – EU, at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.
htm>, both last accessed on 22 October 2010).
2 Regulation 1383/2003 (Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003 
concerning customs action against goods suspected of infringing 
certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be tak-
en against goods found to have infringed such rights, OJ 2003, L 
196/7). India and Brazil also objected to other EU legislative acts 
(i.e. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1891/2004 laying down 
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1383/2003 concerning customs action against goods suspected 
of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures 
to be taken against goods found to have infringed such rights, OJ 
2004 L 328/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establish-
ing the Community Customs Code, OJ 1992, L 302/1; Directive 
2004/48 (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ 2004, L 195/16; 
Regulation (EC) No 816/2006 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the man-
ufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with 
public health problems, OJ 2006, L 157/1) and Dutch provisions 
(e.g., certain provisions of the Dutch Patents Act and the General 
Customs Act of the Netherlands) as well as other relevant Dutch 
regulations, guidelines and administrative practices.
3 Namely Articles V and X of the GATT 1994 and various provisions 
of the TRIPs Agreement, namely, Article 28 read together with Ar-
ticle 2, Articles 41 and 42, and Article 31 read together with the 
provisions of the August 2003 Decision on TRIPs and Public Health.
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ably priced generics and pharmaceutical products in 
general.
The facts of the case are the following. Between 
October and December 2008, Dutch customs authori-
ties blocked a number of shipments of generic drugs 
coming from India and destined to various Latin 
American countries at Schiphol, the airport of Am-
sterdam. These products were detained on grounds 
that they might infringe patents that are owned 
by several pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Sanofi-
Aventis, Glaxo, Ely Lilly, Du Pont, Merck) and that 
cover important drugs such as clopidogrel, abacavir, 
olanzapine, rivastigmine and losartan. Both India 
and Brazil stress that (i) the generics in question were 
produced in India4 and were not directed to the EU 
market and that (ii) the patents invoked for blocking 
such products are valid in the EU Member States, but 
not in India nor in the countries of final destination.
India and Brazil, together with some health related 
NGOs, claim that these seizures contravene certain 
TRIPS and GATT provisions and also cause grave 
damage to public health in developing and least-de-
veloped countries by delaying or denying them ac-
cess to life-saving drugs; e.g., the price of medicines 
would go up in the destination countries, since the 
transportation costs would inevitably increase.
The EU argues that patent protection in general 
and these measures specifically, far from intending 
to damage the access to medicine of above mentioned 
countries, do aim at protecting public health. In fact, 
the target of these measures is precisely to protect 
public health. Indeed, by protecting patents – EU’s ar-
gument goes – the commercialization of counterfeit 
drugs is prevented and pharmaceutical companies 
have incentives to invest in the development of new 
and useful drugs: this is also to the benefit of the 
population of developing or least-developed coun-
tries5. Additionally, blocking generics in transit at the 
EU customs aims at preventing the old “nightmare” 
of Big Pharma – i.e. the re-importation of low-price 
products into the EU market – of recurring. Indeed 
such risk of re-importation is deemed to have a dis-
couraging effect on R&D investments in the health 
sector6.
Other countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Venezuela, Nigeria and South Africa are interested 
in the outcome of this case. Some of these countries 
regularly import generics manufactured by Indian 
companies and others might do so in the near future.
II. Are the seizures in breach of TRIPS?
India and Brazil stress that the drugs in question are 
patented in EU states, but not in India or in the coun-
tries of final destination. This appears to be a strong 
argument. How can the EU – India and Brazil en-
quire – invoke intellectual property rights to block ge-
nerics coming from and destined to countries where 
the drugs in question do not enjoy patent protection?
The EU instead argues that the Dutch authorities 
did not carry out “seizures” but merely “temporary 
detentions” of goods suspected of infringing pat-
ent rights valid within the EU, pursuant to Regula-
tion 1383/2003. In particular, the EU might invoke 
Article 51 TRIPS7 and its footnote 13, which allow 
WTO Member States to temporarily block products 
suspected of infringing intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) at their borders. Footnote 13 specifically states 
that “It is understood that there shall be no obligation 
to apply such [customs] procedures to imports of goods 
put on the market in another country by or with the 
consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit” (em-
phasis added). Therefore, arguing a contrario, WTO 
Member States would be entitled to apply customs 
procedure to goods in transit through their territories 
as well.
It is true that these TRIPS provisions allow states 
to temporarily block goods at their borders. However, 
it is important to note that such measures must com-
ply with certain requirements8, e.g. those laid down 
in Article 52 TRIPS. This provision states that IPRs 
4 For example, the Indian company Dr Reddy’s manufactures the 
generic drug Losartan.
5 Xavier Seuba, “Free Trade of Pharmaceutical Products: The Limits 
of Intellectual Property Enforcement at the Border”, ICTSD Pro-
gramme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 
27, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(2010), p. 2, available on the Internet at <http://ictsd.org/down-
loads/2010/04/seuba_web_10.pdf> (last accessed on 22 October 
2010).
6 In addition, the EU minimizes the facts of the case and in particular 
notes that the generics blocked at its borders were later released.
7 Article 51 provides that “Members shall, in conformity with the 
provisions set out below, adopt procedures to enable a right hold-
er, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of 
counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods may take place, 
to lodge an application in writing with competent authorities, ad-
ministrative or judicial, for the suspension by the customs authori-
ties of the release into free circulation of such goods. Members may 
enable such an application to be made in respect of goods which 
involve other infringements of intellectual property rights, provided 
that the requirements of this Section are met. Members may also 
provide for corresponding procedures concerning the suspension 
by the customs authorities of the release of infringing goods des-
tined for exportation from their territories” (emphasis added).
8 See emphasis added, supra note 7.
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owners who apply the customs procedures in ques-
tion must provide adequate evidence that “under the 
laws of the country of importation” there is a prima 
facie violation of their rights. Also footnote 14 TRIPS 
provides definitions of counterfeit and pirated goods 
and refers to the “law of the country of importation” 
as the law that will judge the intellectual property 
violation9.
The identification of “the country of importation” 
has therefore become a determining factor10. Is the 
country of importation the EU Member State through 
which the generics transit? Or is it the country of fi-
nal destination? Indeed, in the former case the deten-
tions at the EU borders (and Regulation 1383/2003 
which constitutes their legal basis) would be com-
pliant with TRIPS, as the relevant patents are valid 
in said EU country. Accordingly, right owners could 
easily prove that the generics in question infringe 
their valid patents. Instead, in the latter case the de-
tentions at issue as well as Regulation 1383/2003 that 
generated them would contravene Article 52 TRIPS. 
Indeed, in this scenario right holders could not give 
evidence of a patent infringement under the laws of 
the final destination country, as they enjoy no patent 
rights there.
It goes without saying that it would be helpful 
to have an authoritative interpretation from a WTO 
adjudicatory body to clarify the exact meaning of 
“country of importation”.
The debate surrounding the definition of the 
meaning of “country of importation” leads us to an-
other focal point of this dispute: the alleged viola-
tion of the principle of “independence” of patents, 
enshrined in Article 4-bis Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property. This principle is 
incorporated into TRIPS11 and states that patents ap-
plied for in one country are independent of patents 
obtained for the same invention in other countries. 
This rule is closely related to another fundamental 
rule of intellectual property law, namely the territori-
ality principle, according to which protection offered 
in one state does not entitle a party to acquire identi-
cal protection in another one.
Having said that, some commentators believe 
that invoking patent infringement grounds to block 
goods coming from, and directed to, countries 
where those products do not enjoy patent protec-
tion contravenes the principle of independence of 
patents12. In other words, it is believed that these 
measures turn out to give patents valid in the EU 
an extra-territorial effect.
A pertinent example, affirmed by a Dutch court13 
and invoked by Dutch customs authorities when it 
came to blocking goods in transit (including the ge-
nerics in the India-Brazil/EU dispute), is the “manu-
facturing fiction” principle. This allows authorities to 
fictitiously assume that products in transit have been 
manufactured in the Netherlands and thus can be 
subject to customs detentions on grounds of alleged 
infringement of a Dutch patent. This rule is believed 
to contravene the principle of independence of pat-
ents. As has been pointed out, “it is hard to imagine a 
greater departure from the principle of independence 
of patents than the ‘manufacturing fiction’ that is said 
to support a finding of infringement of a Netherlands 
patent by an action in India. The absence of a patent in 
India where the manufacturing takes place (and which 
is independent of the Netherlands) is completely ig-
nored […]”14.
A decision from WTO judicial bodies on the al-
leged incompatibility of the “manufacturing fiction” 
rule with the principle of independence of patents en-
shrined in Article 4-bis Paris Convention could shed 
some light on this controversial issue, and would be 
most welcome.
III. Other relevant issues
Other factors must also be taken into consideration.
(i) There is a strong argument that the seizures at 
the EU borders amount to an unjustified barrier 
9 Shashank P. Kumar, “Border Enforcement of IP Rights Against In 
Transit Generic Pharmaceuticals: An Analysis of Character and 
Consistency”, 32 European Intellectual Property Review (2010), 
pp. 506 et sqq., at p. 512.
10 Shashank P. Kumar, “International Trade, Public Health, and In-
tellectual Property Maximalism: The Case of European Border 
Enforcement and Trade in Generic Pharmaceuticals”, 5 GT & CJ 
(2010), pp. 155 et sqq., at p. 160.
11 Article 4-bis Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty states that “Patents applied for in the various countries of the 
Union by nationals of countries of the Union shall be independ-
ent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, 
whether members of the Union or not.” See also Article 2.1 TRIPS 
which incorporates said provision.
12 See, for example, Frederick M. Abbott, “Seizure of Generics Phar-
maceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of Patent Infringement: 
A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Welfare”, 
1 WIPOJ (2009), pp. 43 et sqq., at p. 44.
13 Court of Hague, Case 311378 Sisvel v. Sosecal. In this decision the 
court clarified that the Dutch customs authorities may suspend 
goods in transit on grounds of alleged infringement of a Dutch 
patent. In particular, it stressed that the “manufacturing fiction” 
principle could be inferred by Recital 8 Regulation 1383/2003.
14 Frederick M. Abbott, supra note 12, at p. 48.
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to trade (namely a south-south trade) between 
countries and therefore contravene the spirit and 
the provisions of the GATT/WTO system and of 
TRIPS15 in particular.
 First, such measures would jeopardize the mar-
ket liberalization objective pursued by the GATT/
WTO system. Indeed, in the recitals of the Agree-
ment that establish the WTO, Member States de-
clare that they wish to expand “[…] the production 
of and trade in goods and services” (Recital 1) by 
means of “arrangements directed to the substan-
tial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade” 
(Recital 3). The seizures discussed in this case, 
however, seem to go in the opposite direction.
 India and Brazil claim that the detentions of Indian 
generics at the EU customs border – in transit from 
India to certain Latin American countries – contra-
venes Article V(2) GATT on “freedom of transit” in 
particular. This provision states that “[t]here shall 
be freedom of transit through the territory of each 
contracting party, via the routes most convenient for 
international transit, for traffic in transit to or from 
the territory of other contracting parties”.
 TRIPS also aims at reducing obstacles to interna-
tional trade of goods. In particular, Recital 1 TRIPS 
stresses that WTO Member States wish “to reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade, 
and taking into account the need to promote effec-
tive and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights, to ensure that measures and procedures to 
enforce intellectual property rights do not them-
selves become barriers to legitimate trade” (empha-
sis added). Moreover, Article 41 obliges Members 
to ensure that enforcement procedures – including 
customs actions – are applied in such a manner 
that the creation of barriers to legitimate trade is 
avoided, and to provide for safeguards against po-
tential abuse. The underlying principle of the latter 
recital and provision is that an overprotection of 
intellectual property rights could be detrimental 
to international trade.
 It could then be argued that detaining products 
in transit at the borders when they are patented 
neither in the countries of origin nor in the final 
destination countries constitutes an overprotec-
tion of intellectual property rights and creates 
obstacles to legitimate trade, thus infringing the 
above principles and provisions.
(ii) An argument the EU might put forward is the 
following: the detentions of Indian generics at the 
borders are lawful, as the mere transit of IPRs-
infringing goods through customs should be con-
sidered as an activity that can be prohibited by 
IPRs owners.
 Yet, it should be noted that the very case law of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is inconsist-
ent on this matter16. Indeed, in two cases the ECJ 
basically held that goods in external transit (from 
a non-Community Member State to another non-
Community Member State) suspected of infring-
ing IPRs could be detained by customs17. In other 
cases the same Court basically concluded that 
the temporary storage in a customs warehouse 
of infringing goods with transit status and their 
external transit (in case no evidence of third party 
action to distribute the products within the EU 
market is brought) do not violate IPRs18.
 Such inconsistent case law weakens the above ar-
gument. Indeed, how could the EU validly claim 
that the transit of Indian generics through its 
customs constitutes patent infringement and can 
therefore be lawfully blocked, while the very case 
law of its most important judicial body has given 
contradictory guidelines on this issue?19
(iii) Moreover India, Brazil and a number of legal 
commentators believe that the seizures at the EU 
borders violate the spirit of the Doha Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference on 
the 14th of November 200120. Paragraph 4 of this 
declaration states that “TRIPS Agreement does 
not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health” and that TRIPS 
“should be interpreted and implemented in a man-
ner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access 
to medicines for all”. From the point of view of 
15 Xavier Seuba, supra note 5, pp. 22 et sqq.
16 Enrico Bonadio, “Protecting Intellectual Property Rights through 
EU Customs Procedures”, 14(4) International Trade Law & Regu-
lation (2008), pp. 80 et sqq., at pp. 85–88.
17 Case C-383/98 See Polo/Lauren Co LP v. Dwidua Langgeng Prata-
ma International Freight Forwarders [2000] ECR I-2519; Case 
C-60/02 Re Montres Rolex SA [2004] ECR I-651
18 See Case C-405/03 Class International BV v. Colgate – Palmolive 
Co [2005] ECR I – 8735; Case C-281/05 Montex Holdings v. Die-
sel SpA [2006] ECR I-108881.
19 The ECJ might soon give more certain guidelines on this issue when 
delivering its decision in Nokia v. Their Majesty’s Commissioners of 
Revenue and Customs (Case C-495/09) which concerns an analo-
gous matter.
20 See the Indian complaint with the WTO, supra note 1. See also 
Abbott, supra note 12, p. 49 (who seems to take such view).
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India and Brazil, supplying generics to countries 
such as certain Latin American states in need of 
medicine at affordable prices is amongst those 
“measures to protect public health” that should not 
be hampered. In general, it is strongly believed 
that India’s generics industry makes a huge con-
tribution to public health worldwide.
 Moreover, Brazil and India contend that the EU 
seizures also jeopardize the target of the so-called 
Paragraph 6 system.21 This mechanism specifi-
cally aims to allow WTO members to issue com-
pulsory licences to export generic versions of pat-
ented medicines to countries with insufficient or 
no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical 
sector22. Indeed, it is believed that the measures 
in question and customs’ interference with the 
international trade of generics in general are ca-
pable of discouraging the use of the Paragraph 6 
system. For example, the search for potential li-
censees in the importing and exporting countries 
could be rendered more difficult23, since manu-
facturers of generics might be worried about pos-
sible customs intervention and accordingly refuse 
to act as licensees and to trade in such goods.
IV. Conclusions
As shown above, negotiations between the parties for 
an amicable settlement of the dispute are on-going 
and an agreement might soon be reached.
In particular, the EU is likely to favour an amica-
ble settlement envisaging a modification of Regula-
tion 1383/2003 to avoid future detention of goods in 
transit suspected to infringe IPRs. Two main points 
lead us to believe this.
First of all the arguments in favour of EU seizures 
seem rather weak, as illustrated by the inconsistent 
decisions from the ECJ. Rather, a strong argument 
can be made that the seizures in question amount to 
a trade barrier between countries and contravene the 
spirit and the provisions of the GATT/WTO system 
and particularly TRIPS.
Second, the EU does not seem to have a strong 
commercial interest in blocking generics not directed 
to its internal market (except an interest in prevent-
ing re-importations24). India, on the contrary, does 
have a strong commercial interest in this trade. In-
deed, the generics business is very lucrative for In-
dian undertakings, as the pharmaceutical industry 
of this country gets by far the highest percentage of 
its revenues from exporting generic drugs. If the EU 
and the Netherlands in particular do not change their 
customs legislation and policy regarding products 
in transit, Indian pharmaceutical companies could 
soon choose alternative commercial routes, such as 
the Panama Canal, instead of EU ports or airports.
Mitigating Climate Change through 
the Promotion of Technology 
Transfer and the Use of Environmentally 
Sound Technologies (ESTs): 
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights
Meir Perez Pugatch*
I. Introduction
Increasing energy consumption and rising green-
house gas (GHG) emissions have led up to one of the 
most pressing challenges of the 21st century: climate 
change. Alarmed by the tangible changes in the cli-
mate, both developed and developing countries are 
making conscious efforts to explore technologies that 
would help mitigate this phenomenon. International 
bodies such as the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and lead-
21 The system takes its name from paragraph 6 Doha Declaration 
which provides that “[…] WTO members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under 
the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002”. The mechanism was then devised 
by the WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 and Pro-
tocol of amendment to Article 31 TRIPS of 6 December 2005. In 
particular, the 2003 Decision introduced a temporary waiver to 
TRIPS Agreement and the 2005 Protocol made that permanent.
22 Actually this system has not been successful; thus far it has been 
used just once (by Rwanda).
23 Under the paragraph 6 system states which need to import gener-
ics should preliminarily identify two licensees, one in their terri-
tory and another in the exporting country.
24 Yet the risk of re-importation is often considered theoretical. Also 
the European Commission recognized that drugs destined to de-
veloping and least developed countries are seldom channelled 
back into rich markets such as the EU; see Carlos M. Correa, “Im-
plications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health”, World Health Organization (2002), Geneva, p. 32 
(note 99), available on the Internet at <http://archives.who.int/tbs/
global/s2301e.pdf> (last accessed on 22 October 2010). * Dr. Meir Perez Pugatch, Senior Lecturer, University of Haifa, Israel.
